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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OvEvMW
Six of the Tenth Circuit's decisions during the period of this
survey in the area of public lands and natural resources merit
attention. One of them, Utah v. Kleppe,' will be examined at
length since it is sure to have far-reaching consequences. All six
fall within three of the four areas usually addressed in this sec-
tion: public lands, oil and gas, and environmental law. There
were no Tenth Circuit decisions in the area of water law.
I. PUBLIC LANDS
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Utah v. Kleppe merits ex-
tended analysis because of its potential impact economically as
well as legally. The decision in United States v. City of
McAlester2 will also be examined briefly, since its holding and
rationale are strikingly similar to Kleppe. Although the specific
subject matter of the two cases varied greatly, the holdings in
each involved the resolution of apparent statutory conflicts in
favor of parties who were perceived to have a "special status" vis-
a-vis the federal government. The rationale employed in the two
cases suggests the Tenth Circuit will construe statutes involving
public lands so as to prevent any "violation" of the federal gov-
ernment's "special obligations" to such parties.
A. Utah v. Kleppe
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Utah v. Kleppe may
have opened a way for states to reap profits from mineral lands,
arguably at the expense of the federal government. The case con-
cerned the criteria which govern state selections of lands which
are mineral in character as indemnity for lands of similar charac-
ter which were originally granted under the school land grant
statutes, but were denied to the state because of federal preemp-
tion or private entry prior to survey. 3 The primary issue was how
'586 F.2d 756 (1978).
No. 76-1455 (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
In the various enabling acts admitting the public land states to the Union, Congress
granted certain sections in each township to the state to be held in trust and administered
for the benefit of the public schools. Title to the school sections vested in the state upon
acceptance of the survey of those sections, but only if the designated lands had not been
appropriated under the public land laws by private parties or the federal government prior
to survey. To compensate the states for those lands lost, Congress granted them the right
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much discretion the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) has
in determining whether to approve a state's "in-lieu" selections.
Utah claimed that sections 851 and 852 of the federal statutes
governing land grants to states4 gave states broad discretion in
selecting in-lieu lands. It contended that those provisions limited
the Secretary's function to the ministerial task of determining
whether the selected and original or "base" lands were both min-
eral in character and were of equal acreage.5 The Secretary, in
contrast, claimed that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA)6
had expanded his discretion, authorizing him to go beyond the
criterion of equal acreage and employ the public interest criterion
of equal value in determining whether to approve Utah's in-lieu
selections The court settled the statutory conflict in favor of
Utah, affirming the district court's holding that "the exchange of
school lands lost for 'in-lieu' lands to be selected by Utah is to be
undertaken on the equal acreage basis once it is determined that
the respective lands are 'mineral in character' without regard to
valuation."
The economic significance of Kleppe derives in part from the
patchwork nature of present land ownership patterns and the
growing importance of oil shale in the Rocky Mountain area. This
is evidenced by the fact that Uintah County, Utah, is the site of
all 194 parcels of the Utah indemnity selections at issue, and
Uintah County has also been proposed as a likely site for the first
commercial oil shale project in Utah.' Studies indicate Uintah is
currently a hodgepodge of intermingled federal, state, and pri-
vately owned lands.'0 Although Utah law permits the leasing of
state owned lands for oil shale," the limited size of the present,
isolated, state sections would prevent them from independently
supporting an oil shale development program. 2 The availability
to select "other lands of equal acreage" in lieu of the lands lost. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852
(1976).
43 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852 (1976).
586 F.2d at 760, 762.
43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
586 F.2d at 759, 760, 762.
Id. at 767.
See Eliason, Land Exchanges and State In-Lieu Selections as They Effect Mineral
Resource Development, 21 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 617, 621 & n.10 (1975).
o Id. at 621-26.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-1-18 (1953).
"1 See Eliason, supra note 9, at 619-26 for an excellent discussion of the effect of land
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for oil shale leasing and development of the federal lands inter-
spersed with the state and private holdings is as uncertain as the
federal oil shale policy itself.
Thus, Utah's acquisition of the oil shale lands claimed as
indemnity selections could facilitate early development of the oil
shale, and could give the state a bigger share in the profits from
such development.'
3
Kleppe establishes a new precedent, legally, since no court
has previously determined whether the Secretary's discretion in
determining whether to approve state in-lieu selections under
section 852 was broadened by section 7 of the TGA. In refusing
to construe section 7 as authorizing the Secretary to impose an
equal value limitation on states' in-lieu selection rights under
section 852, the court relied heavily on the premise that the land
grant statutes create a unique "trust" or "compact" relationship,
under which continuing, unalterable obligations are imposed on
both the states and the federal government. It was perhaps neces-
sary for the court to shore up the statutory basis for its decision,
in view of the impact and controversy the decision is bound to
produce. However, one suspects that the rationale, as it extends
the "trust" analogy, goes precariously off on a limb.
1. The Case
Utah, like many other states, lost thousands of acres of enti-
tlement lands, but was reluctant to select non-mineral lands in
lieu of the lost lands which were mineral in character." When
mineral lands were opened to in-lieu selections in 1958, most of
the federal lands in Uintah County became subject to such selec-
tions. Thus,' between 1965 and 1971, Utah made indemnity selec-
ownership patterns on mineral development.
11 As noted in Eliason, supra note 9, at 644-45, the decision in Kleppe will also have
a significant impact on all other states still owning indemnity rights on mineral lands.
For example, Montana filed in-lieu selections in 1974 on lands identified by the U.S.
Geological Survey as having strippable coal deposits. The Bureau of Land Management
suspended action on Montana's application pending the outcome of Kleppe. Id.
" Congress originally excluded mineral lands from school land grants. However, in
1927 it extended the original grants to include lands "mineral in character." Mineral
School Section Land Grants, Pub. L. No. 570, ch. 57, § 1, 44 Stat. 1026 (current version
at 43 U.S.C. § 870 (1976)). Thirty years later it finally granted states the right to select
mineral lands for in-lieu selections, as long as the corresponding base lands lost were also
mineral in character. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-771, 72 Stat. 928 (amending 43
U.S.C. §§ 851. 852 (1976)).
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tions covering 157,255.90 acres of mineral lands in Uintah
County, using lost mineral lands of equal acreage as the basis.1'5
The Secretary delayed taking any action on Utah's selections
for many years.'" Finally, in March of 1974, Utah instituted suit
against the Secretary. The Tentb Circuit opinion in Kleppe re-
sponded to the Secretary's appeal of a summary judgment
granted by the Utah District Court in favor of Utah, enjoining
him to approve or disapprove Utah's selections by a certain
date. 7 The basic issue on appeal as suggested earlier, was
whether the Secretary's discretion in approving or rejecting such
in-lieu selections is governed by sections 851 and 852 of the land
grant statutes, which favor the states by listing equal acreage as
the selection criterion, or by section 7 of the TGA, which favors
the federal government by allowing use of the equal value crite-
rion. Perhaps in recognition of the significant economic impact
the decision was bound to have, the Tenth Circuit rendered a
carefully reasoned and broadly based series of justifications for its
holding in favor of Utah
2. Analysis
The court's statutory analysis is convincing. Under sections
851 and 852, the equal acreage requirement is the only pertinent
limitation on a state's right to make in-lieu selections. Neither
section makes any reference to the relative value of the in-lieu
and base lands. 8 The TGA, on the other hand, grants the Secre-
tary broad authority to classify lands within a grazing district "in
his discretion," in order to determine if such lands are proper for
acquisition in satisfaction of "any outstanding lien . . . rights or
land grant . . . .'"' The court recognized that all federal lands
" 586 F.2d at 758, 761.
' As the court noted, the Secretary had still not acted with respect to any of Utah's
selections when the instant appeal was heard, even though many of the selections had
been pending for a period in excess of ten years. Id. at 761
I Id. at 758.
" Section 851 simply provides that where deficiencies arise in state school grants,
"other lands of equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected,
in accordance with the provisions of section 852 . . . by said State in lieu of such as may
be thus taken. ... 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976). Section 852 provides that "lands appropri-
ated by section 851 . . . shall be selected from any unappropriated, surveyed, or unsur-
veyed public lands within the State," except that mineral lands may only be selected as
indemnity for mineral lands lost. 43 U.S.C. § 852(a), (a)(1) (1976).
1' Section 7 authorizes the Secretary "to examine and classify any lands . . . within
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in Utah are within grazing districts, and that the Secretary is
authorized to utilize public interest criteria, including compari-
tive values, in classifying lands within grazing districts in order
to determine their proper disposition. However, the court placed
great reliance upon the fact that in-lieu selections under the
school land grant statutes were not specifically mentioned in the
TGA. Since both the history and judicial construction of the
school land grants suggest school grant in-lieu selections have a
unique status,20 the court did not feel compelled to "substitute
the general language [of the TGA] for the unambiguous, clear,
and unqualified language" defining rights of the states in sections
851 and 852." It found further support for that conclusion in the
rule of statutory construction which decrees that where an earlier,
special statute and a later, general statute seem to speak to the
same issue, the special remains in effect as an exception to the
general regarding all matters coming within the scope of the spe-
cial, unless absolute incompatibility exists between the two.2
The Kleppe court seemed to realize that its holding might be
too controversial to survive if grounded only in the arguably in-
conclusive wording of the statutes and rules of statutory construc-
tion. It broadened the base of its holding through reliance on two
early Supreme Court opinions, which it claimed "clearly and suc-
cinctly settled the statutory construction conflict presented here
in favor of Utah. '" The two Supreme Court cases relied upon did
severely limit the scope of the Secretary's discretion under section
852. They held that once a state has "accepted" the Congres-
sional "offer" in section 851 by making a selection pursuant to
section 852, the Secretary is restricted to the judicial function of
a grazing district, which are. . . proper for acquisition in satisfaction of any outstanding
lien . . . rights or land grant, and to open such lands to entry, selection or location for
disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public land laws ....
Such lands shall not be subject to disposition, settlement, or occupation until after the
same have been classified and opened to entry. ... 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
586 F.2d at 758-59, 761, 766.
I d. at 766-67. One fact noted by the court is particularly telling. The legislative
history of Pub. L. No. 89-470, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1965) (which amended §§ 851 and
852 in minor fashion) indicates that the Department of the Interior withdrew its proposed
amendment, which would have included an equal values concept with respect to lands
valuable for leasable minerals, in the place of the existing "acre for acre" selection basis.
586 F.2d at 761, citing S. REP. No. 1213, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 2323-24.
" 586 F.2d at 768-69.
n Id. at 769.
1979
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"ascertaining whether the selector is acting with the law . . . and
of approving or rejecting the selection accordingly."24 In other
words, they perceived the in-lieu provisions as embodying the
federal government's offer of "a conveyance of the title to those
who accept and fully comply with their terms."'- These holdings
support the Kleppe court's thesis that the school grant in-lieu
provisions, as opposed to most other public land in-lieu provi-
sions, grant broad selective powers to the state-selector, and se-
verely restrict the Secretary's power to reject the selections. How-
ever, the real issue in Kleppe is whether section 7 of the TGA, as
amended in 1936, was intended to alter the Secretary's discretion
regarding selections under section 852. Since both Supreme Court
cases were decided in 1921, they are certainly not controlling on
that issue.
Since neither statutory construction nor case law offers con-
clusive justification for the holding, the precedential strength of
Kleppe may well depend on the perceived validity of the underly-
ing premise that the land grant statutes create a "trust" or
"solemn covenant" imposing bilateral and continuing obligations
on Congress as well as the states. The court's initial development
of the premise is convincing, since it grounds it firmly in the
wording and history of the land grant statutes, as well as in cases
construing them. Since the land-grant states, as opposed to the
original thirteen states, contained huge reserves of non-taxable
federal lands, they lacked an adequate property tax base from
which to generate revenues for schools and other services. Thus,
the school land grants represented the government's attempt to
equalize the status of the original and land grant states: in place
of having additional land to tax, the land grant states were given
sections of land, in trust, to be held and administered for the
perpetual benefit of schools in that state.26 Since the federal gov-
ernment offered the land grants for that purpose in the various
enabling acts, and the states accepted the offer-and its rights
and obligations-in their state constitutions, a compact was cre-
ated. Under that compact, the court argued, states and the fed-
eral government, as well, were required to abide strictly by the
Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367, 371 (1921). The other Supreme Court decision
relied upon was Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489 (1921).
5 Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367, 370 (1921).
" 586 F.2d at 758.
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terms of the "trust" and to accept continuing, unalterable obliga-
tions.2" Thus, when a state waives its right to the original grant
and makes an in-lieu selection pursuant to the criteria prescribed
in the statute, it would be "unreasonable" and "contrary to the
solemn covenant of the United States" to hold that the federal
government is not bound by its covenant to approve such selec-
tions under the criteria designated in the statute.28 '
Although the "solemn compact" justification seems both
convincing and "equitable" in view of the original purpose of the
land grant statutes, the subsequent history of those statutes
leaves the validity of the justification in doubt. While the states
have not been able to alter their side of the "compact, "2 Congress
has altered the nature of the government's obligation several
times.30 Indeed, both the appeal and the weakness of the "special
compact" justification are most evident in an analogy the Kleppe
court draws to explain it. The court compared Congress' preferen-
tial treatment of school land grants "to the special preference
and treatment of Indians [recently] recognized [by the Supreme
Court]" '3' in Morton v. Mancari.32 The Mancari Court justified
Congress' allowance of the preferential employment of Indians
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs as "[a] fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians," just as the Kleppe court
justified the special discretionary status given to states in making
in-lieu selections as a fulfillment of the federal government's
unique obligation to the states under the bilateral compact repre-
sented by the land grant statutes. Unfortunately, if the "prefer-
ential" treatment of Indians by the federal government in re-
sponse to its unique obligation to them is indicative of the treat 7
ment to be accorded states' rights under the land grant statutes,
as suggested by the Kleppe court's analogy, the longevity of the
Kleppe precedent is at best uncertain.
- Id. at 758, 761, 767.
0Id. at 772.
n See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); Lassen v.
Arizona, ex. rel. Arizona Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458 (1967); Ervien v. United States,
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
See note 14 supra and discussion in Kleppe, 586 F.2d at 759-60.
"586 F.2d at 769.




B. United States v. City of McAlester
The Tenth Circuit followed the Kleppe-Mancari "breach-of-
trust" rationale implicitly in one other case decided this year. In
United States v. City of McAlester, it rejected a city's contention
that Congress had authorized condemnation of Indian tribal
lands for municipal purposes in the Curtis Act.34 In holding that
the authorization of condemnation in the Curtis Act was applica-
ble only to allotted Indian lands, as opposed to reservations, the
court noted that if the Act had been intended to provide for
"unabated, unsupervised condemnation of all Indian lands in
general," as the city contended, "there would have been a serious
question of whether the United States had thereby breached its
trust relationship with the Indian tribes.
3 5
McAlester, like Kleppe, concerned an apparent conflict be-
tween two federal statutes. In 1903, a federal territorial court in
Oklahoma had granted McAlester an easement on 2535 acres of
land owned by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (the Tribes)
for the purpose of developing and maintaining a municipal water
supply.N The primary issue in the Tenth Circuit opinion was the
validity of that easement.
McAlester contended that the condemnation authority
granted in section 11 of the Curtis Act did not distinguish be-
tween allotted and unallotted lands; it merely declared, in broad
terms, that towns and cities "are hereby authorized to secure, by
condemnation or otherwise, all the lands actually necessary for
public improvements, regardless of tribal lines . . . .,3 The
court concluded that both the full context of the Act and its leg-
islative history indicated the condemnation provision was appli-
cable only to allotted lands. However, as in Kleppe, it chose to
look beyond the wording of the statute and legislative history for
its basic justification. It noted that federal statutes prohibiting
the disposition of interests in Indian lands other than by treaty
or convention have been in effect for 187 years.3" Thus, a valid
Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.
' No. 76-1455 at 18, (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
" See City of South McAlester v. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of Tribes of
Indians, No. 3293 (C.D. Ind. Terr., 1903), cited in No. 76-1455 at 3.
" Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, § 11, 30 Stat. 495.
'" See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) for the current version of the prohibition noted. The
initial version of that prohibition was in the first Indian Intercourse Act, Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
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right to condemn Indian land must be based on express authori-
zation from the United States. It then focused on the federal
government's obligation to the Indians, as established by treaties
and modified by statutes, in determining whether section 11 of
the Curtis Act constituted the necessary authorization.
Looking to history, the court described the gradual diminish-
ment of the Tribes' original lands through a series of treaties in
which the Tribes "agreed" to relinquish lands to the United
States in return for certain other lands. In the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek,3' for example, the United States granted the Tribes
fee simple ownershp of land which included the acres in dispute.
It later issued a patent confirming the Tribes' ownership of the
land "in fee simple. . . while they shall exist as a nation and live
on it; liable to no transfer or alienation, except to the United
States or with their consent."0
The McAlester court recognized the long-declared "right" of
Congress to alter Indian treaties by enactment of subsequent
statutes. In fact, the Curtis Act, which incorporated an agree-
ment which the Tribes reluctantly signed with the United States
in 1897,"' represented one such alteration, in that it provided for
forced allotment of Indian lands to tribal members and the termi-
nation of tribal affairs. Section 11 provided for those forced allot-
ments and, in the same section, for condemnation of Indian lands
by cities. However, by construing the condemnation provision as
applicable only to allotted lands-lands no longer possessed by
the Tribes as a whole-the McAlester court avoided construing
the provision as a radical departure from the long-standing
"protective stance"'" of the federal government toward Indian
lands, when those lands are claimed by states or private individu-
als.
N 7 Stat. 333 (1830).
0 No. 76-1455 at 16, citing the patent which was issued to the Choctaw Nation on
March 23, 1842.
'The Choctaws and Chickasaws entered the Atoke Agreement with the Dawes Com-
mission on April 23, 1897, "[despite reluctance to do so." Id. at 17.
0 For cases and commentaries reflecting the development of and departures from the
government's "protective stance," see Kelly, Indian Title: The Rights of American Na-
tives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 655
(1975); Note, Administrative Law: Self-Determination and the Consent Power: The Role
of the Government in Indian Decisions, 5 Am. IND. L. Rav. 195 (1977); M. Plsca, LAw AmD
Tfl AmmCAN INDLAN (1973).
1979
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As noted earlier, the McAlester court went even further, in
dicta, by questioning whether Congress would have the right to
exercise its inherent power to authorize "unabated, unsupervised
condemnation of all Indian lands in general."43 The court's strong
suggestion that such an act would cause Congress to "breach.
its trust relationship with the Indian tribes,"" like the court's
narrow construction of the Curtis Act's condemnation provision,
represents a commendable attempt to restore order to the maze
of legal inequities on which the current relationship between the
federal government and the Indians is based.
II. OIL AND GAS
A. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. FERC'5
The Tenth Circuit decision in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v
FERC expanded the scope of the Natural Gas Act (NGA)I' to
include royalty interests for the first time. However, that expan-
sion was impelled by the much broader expansion of the NGA
established by the Supreme Court the preceding month in Cali-
fornia v. Southland Royalty Co.'7 Thus, insofar as Jicarilla
merely articulates an inevitable extension of Southland's holding,
it is not especially significant. However, the inconsistencies-if
not inequities-embodied in the Jicarilla opinion are significant.
Although those inconsistencies result from the court's reliance on
Southland, they are not resolved or justified by the Southland
rationale. Rather, they serve to illustrate the legal and logical
distortions which must result from Southland's judicial expan-
sion of the jurisdiction of the NGA to persons clearly not within
its intended scope.
Jicarilla addressed an issue which has assumed increasing
importance recently due to the price disparity between regulated
and unregulated markets for natural gas: Can a lessee's sales of
gas in the interstate market under the required "certificate of
public convenience and necessity"'" subject the lessor's retained
,1 No. 76-1455 at 18.
" Id.
,5 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
47 98 S. Ct. 1955 (1978).
,1 The NGA requires any person or natural gas company wishing to engage in sales
of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce to first obtain a certificate authorizing
such sales, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976).
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right to take royalty in kind to regulation by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)?" Both the wording of the NGA
and its established construction by the courts stress the fact that
the jurisdictional event which triggers imposition of NGA regula-
tory authority on natural gas disposition is the sale of gas for
resale in interstate commerce." Thus, landowner-lessors not sell-
ing gas to that market were not generally held subject to the Act
prior to Southland.5 However, the increasing need to prevent
diversions of gas from the low-priced, high-demand interstate
market into the higher priced intrastate market has been paral-
leled by the increasing tendency of the FERC and some courts to
enlarge the jurisdictional scope of the NGA.52
The most definitive judicial resolution of the Jicarilla issue
prior to Southland occurred in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC.s In that
case the District of Columbia Circuit firmly rejected the FPC's
attempt to draw royalty interests within the scope of the NGA.
Circuit Judge Leventhal, writing for the court, concluded that the
FPC distorted the common understanding of words used in the
Act and departed from congressional intent when it character-
ized the lessor's retention of a royalty interest in gas sold as a
participation in interstate sales.5 He recognized the FPC's mo-
tive for expanding its jurisdiction may only have been to imple-
ment an underlying purpose of the Act by protecting consumers.
However, he found that motive was "not sufficient justification
" The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was granted general jurisdiction to effec-
tuate the provisions of the NGA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717a(9), 717o (1976). However, the FPC
was disbanded and its functions transferred to the FERC by the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, §§ 204, 402-404 (to be codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7134, 7172; 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, d, e, g, h, w).
For discussions of the increasing importance and judicial treatments of both royalty
rates and rights to take royalty in kind, see Morris, Taking Royalty Gas In Kind, 22 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 993 (1976); Note, Federal Rate Regulation of Independent Oil and
Gas Producers and the Royalty Interest, 26 KAN. L. Rxv. 309 (1978).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976). Courts have repeatedly stressed "the need for a
jurisdictional foundation in 'sales in interstate commerce.'" See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,
463 F.2d 256, 262 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972) (noting such a judicial trend).
See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954).
11 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256, 259 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972).
" See Moody, Uncertainty in Natural Gas Regulation and Legislation-A Dilemma
for the Gas Producer and His Attorney, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 695 (1976).
"463 F.2d 256 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
54 Id. at 262.
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upon which to base an expansion of the Act to activities clearly
not within its terms.
' '
5
In Southland, the Supreme Court abruptly departed from
the well-established precedent represented by Mobil Oil and from
the NGA's own explicit definite of its scope. It expanded the
scope of the Act by holding that a lessee's "dedication" 6 of gas
to the interstate market under a certificate of necessity imposes
an obligation to continue such sales upon the lessor-owner to
whom the mineral fee interest in the subject gas reverts upon
expiration of the lease.57
1. The Case
Jicarilla involved a lessor's reserved right to take royalty in
kind. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe (the Tribe) had leased land on
its reservation to gas companies, who sold the gas produced from
the land in the interstate market. Under the lease, the Tribe
reserved the right to elect royalty in kind, and its decision to
exercise that right was the genesis of the case.
The Tribe evidently intended to sell its royalty gas initially
to the companies for resale in interstate commerce. However, it
ultimately intended to use most of it to meet its own industrial
needs on the reservation, selling only the excess to the compa-
nies.- Although the initial sales to the companies required an
FERC certificate, special regulations exempt small producers
from certain filing requirements and allow them to charge prices
above the interstate ceilings set for large producers." However,
the higher rates are not allowed for sales made by a small produ-
cer "where the gas reserves relating thereto were acquired by the
purchase of developed reserves in place from a large producer."6,
The FERC granted the Tribe a small producer certificate,
but ruled that the election to take royalty in kind was
" Id. at 262-63.
" Once a certificate of necessity is obtained and sales commence, the gas being sold
is deemed "dedicated" to the interstate market, and the sales or services constituting that
dedication may not cease without abandonment authorization from the FERC, persuant
to 15 U.S.C. 717f(b) (1976). For a thorough study of judicial development of the concept
and parameters of dedication under the NGA, see Conine and Niebrugge, Dedication
Under the Natural Gas Act: Extent and Escape, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 735 (1977).
" 98 S. Ct. 1955, 1959 (1978).
578 F.2d 289, 290 (10th Cir. 1978).
" See 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1977).
" Id. at (c)(2)(ii).
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"'tantamount to a purchase' of the gas"'" from the companies,
thus disqualifying the Tribe from small producer rates. Further-
more, it ruled that the Tribe could not remove the gas from the
interstate market to meet its own industrial needs unless it ob-
tained abandonment authorization from the FERC. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the order requiring abandonment authorization,
but reversed the order disqualifying the Tribe from the small
producer rates.2
The two sections of the Jicarilla opinion are strikingly incon-
sistent; the same reasoning which justifies the holding in the last
section argues against the holding in the first section. In rejecting
the contention that an election to take royalty in kind is tanta-
mount to a purchase, the court relied on basic concepts of prop-
erty law. It noted that the "ownership" of royalty oil remained
in the lessor, "who retained the power of disposition and the right
to receive possession . . . ." Thus, it concluded that the Tribe's
"express reservation of the unqualified right to take royalty in
kind" precluded the conclusion that an election to take royalty
in kind is a purchase.6' However, the characterization of the
right as "unqualified" and commensurate with "the power of
disposition and the right to receive possession" was clearly incon-
sistent with the court's holding in part one. There, the court's
affirmation of the order requiring abandonment authorization
before the Tribe can use its royalty gas to meet its own needs
must proceed from the premise that the royalty right is qualified.
Since the Tribe will almost certainly not be able to get abandon-
ment authorization, 5 the court's holding implicitly characterizes
the right to take royalty in kind as a "qualified" right, which may
not involve either the power of disposition or the right to receive
possession.
' 578 F.2d at 291.
63 Id. at 291-92.
3 Id. at 292 (quoting Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 118 (1927)).
578 F.2d at 292.
" Abandonment is only permitted if the FERC finds the supply of gas is depleted,
or "the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." 15
U.S.C. 717f(b) (1976). In view of the pressing need for more gas in the interstate market,
there is little chance of the FPC determining that public convenience would permit aban-




The inconsistency in Jicarilla derives from the court's reli-
ance upon Southland in part one, in contrast to its reliance upon
established principles of property law and the common sense
meaning of words such as "purchase" in part two. Furthermore,
it appears the reliance on Southland in part one was unavoidable,
given the broad wording of the Southland holding.
Southland concerned the impact of a lessee's dedication on
the rights of the owner of the remainder of the mineral fee inter-
est. The all-encompassing scope of the Court'e expanded con-
struction of the "dedication"-and hence of the jurisdic-
tion-triggered by a sale is evident in its conclusion that "the
obligation to continue service attached to the gas. . . and bound
all those with dominion and power of sale over the gas, including
the lessor to whom it reverted." 6 In attempting to justify such a
conclusion, the Court addressed the questions suggested by the
inconsistencies in Jicarilla: How can a lessee's sale of his limited
interest cause a burden to be imposed on the lessor's unqualified
right to take royalty in kind, or to receive and dispose of the
remainder of his estate? Stated in terms of basic property law,
how can a man give, or "dedicate," that which he does not own?
In response to the foregoing questions, a slim majority of the
Southland Court declared that the "dedication" of gas does not
effect a "gift" or "surrender" of the gas, but only changes its
regulatory status: it is simply "placed within the jurisdiction of
the Commission, so that it may be sold to the public at the 'just
and reasonable' rates specified by section 4 of the Act." 7 The
fallacy of that reasoning, of course, is its failure to consider what
the dissent correctly identifies as the fact which gives the case its
real importance: the great disparity in prices in the regulated and
unregulated markets." Because of that disparity, the holding
greatly reduces the value of the lessor's property right without
compensation, and causes a "revolution in property interests
touching natural gas."'
'9
" 98 S. Ct. at 1959.
I d. at 1960.
U Id. at 1962 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1969 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Southland majority claimed Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960) logically impelled its holding. Sunray,
however, merely held that a private contract between a producer and a pipeline company
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As the discussion of Southland indicates, the inconsistencies
in the rationale supporting the two parts of Jicarilla are not
"explained" by the lengthier rationale offered in Southland. Per-
haps both decisions can only be understood if one looks beyond
the express rationales to the fact of the current need to retain gas
in the interstate market. 0 However, as Judge Leventhall warned
in Mobil Oil, even the commendable desire to achieve an objec-
tive arguably underlying the NGA is not sufficient justification
for judicially expanding the Act to cover persons clearly not
within its scope.
7'
B. Shearn v. Andrus" and McCombs v. FERC
73
Two other oil and gas decisions merit brief discussion, in that
they reached seemingly conflicting conclusions on the issue of
whether strict compliance with pertinent regulations is manda-
tory. In Shearn v. Andrus, the Tenth Circuit furthered well-
established precedent in affirming an Interior Board of Land
Appeals (IBLA) decision that strict compliance with regulations
governing non-competitive oil and gas lease applications was
mandatory.14 The court found the insistence on strict compliance
justified, even though the actual facts of the case indicated that
the expressed objective of the regulation could be met just as well
without strict compliance. However, in McCombs v. FERC, the
court set aside an FERC order requiring strict compliance with
the abandonment authorization procedures under the NGA. The
court held that the facts showed abandonment had occurred, as
a matter of law, making strict compliance with the abandonment
provisions of the NGA unnecessary.7'
could not supplant the FPC's authority in determining how long the gas owned by the
producer would be subject to the dedication he initiated. In extending that holding, the
Southland majority reasoned that "since a private contract is not determinative of the
scope of a dedication, a private lease is not determinative of whether there has been a
dedication." 98 S. Ct. at 1965. That, as the dissent correctly noted, is a non sequitur. Id.
" As one commentator has remarked in reference to recent FPC rulings, "A pattern
of decisions is emerging which might seem irrational, were it riot for the underlying
consideration that the Commission knows that it is not attracting gas to the interstate
market and must therefore compel gas deliveries to that market." See Moody, supra note
52, at 695.
71 463 F.2d 256, 262-63 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
No. 77-1228 (10th Cir., Sept. 19, 1977).
- 570 F.2d 1376 (1978).
" No. 77-1228 at 6.
,1 570 F.2d at 1381.
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The court's willingness in McCombs to forego the traditional
insistence on strict compliance with procedures made mandatory
by the Act might be hailed by some as a new and welcome prece-
dent for looking to the equities or facts of the case, instead of
the wording of the Act, to determine when strict compliance is
necessary. However, the very unique nature of the McCombs
fact pattern, and the obvious problems inherent in any expansion
of the holding beyond its facts, suggest it would be wiser to view
Shearn as the controlling precedent and McCombs is a fleeting
aberration.
Shearn was the first drawee at a public drawing for a non-
competitive oil and gas lease, and hence had the right to receive
the lease, if he was qualified." Unfortunately, he had failed to
include a particular statement of interests with his application,
as required by a regulation in force at that time." Thus, his offer
was rejected. On appeal, he correctly noted that under the facts
in his case, the stated purpose of the regulation would have been
fulfilled whether or not he complied.78 Common sense seemed to
support his contention that strict compliance with the regulation
should not only be mandatory in situations where it was neces-
sary to assure compliance with the public interest, as defined by
the regulation. However, the court placed great reliance on the
fact that the Secretary has consistently determined that the regu-
lation is mandatory in all cases.7 Although consistency may well
be the proverbial hobgoblin in many contexts, in this context the
court wisely perceived it as the most pragmatic way to meet "the
need for evenhandedness" in administering noncompetitive
leases.1 The court might well have added that the widespread
'1 See provisions governing non-competitive leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act,
30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1976), and regulations implementing them. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3110.1-1 to
3110.1-8 (1977).
" 43 C.F.R. § 3130.4-4, amended to delete requirement at issue in 1976. See 41 Fed.
Reg. 43,149 (1976).
No. 77-1228 at 4.
"Id. at 5.
Id. at 6. The court noted that although the lease must go to the first "qualified"
applicant, the Secretary has discretion to determine who is qualified. The regulations help
to contain that discretion. As one commentator has explained, if the more flexible concept
of substantial compliance, so prevalent elsewhere in the law, were applied to the leasing
regulations, the determination of who is qualified might require "an exercise of discretion,
which could more easily lead to an unfounded charge of favoritism than could a strict
application of the regulations in accordance with their letter." ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT.,
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knowledge of the Secretary's policy of insisting on strict compli-
ance, even when the wisdom of requiring strict compliance with
particular regulations appears debatable, mitigates the seeming
harshness of applying the policy to fact patterns such as that in
Shearn.
McCombs involved an FPC finding that a certificate author-
izing the continued sale of gas in interstate commerce was still
in force after several decades, despite a lengthy cessation of all
production. The FPC ruled that since no lessee of the field had
ever received abandonment authorization as required by the
NGA, the party currently holding rights to the field must cease
selling gas produced therefrom to the intrastate market."' The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the cessation of production
and lack of evidence of any recoverable reserves from the tract
over a five year period, plus the "recognition" by all par-
ties-including the FPC-that known reserves were depleted,
constituted abandonment, as a matter of law.82 It reasoned that
strict compliance with the NGA requirements for abandonment
authorization was not required, since the occurrence of abandon-
ment as a matter of law had removed the issue of whether aban-
donment had occurred from the expertise of the FPC.8
The basic fallacy in the court's reasoning is its apparent
assumption that the "fact" of abandonment can be equated with
statutory abandonment under the mandatory NGA provision.
Although FPC letters suggesting that a subsequent lessee initiate
abandonment procedures arguably constituted a recognition by
the FPC that production had ceased, that recognition can hardly
be equated with the required finding, after a hearing, "that the
available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the
continuation of services is unwarranted .... "" Furthermore,
the alleged "recognition" by the original interstate purchaser that
reserves were depleted was qualified, since he reserved the right
LAw or FEEmRAL On. AND GAs Lmis, § 5.14 at 180-81 & n.15 (1977).
" 570 F.2d at 1377, 1379. The FPC held that "there can be no abandonment of a
certificate authorizing interstate service absent strict compliance with the requirements
of petition, notice, hearing and establishment of cause for abandonment" as required
under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976). Id. at 1379.
I d. at 1382.
Id. at 1381.




to reinstall his collection equipment should production begin
again.m Such facts suggest courts might have difficulty determin-
ing when abandonment has occurred, if they choose to replace
agency expertise with their own judgment, yet retain-as they
must-the statutory standards. However, the issue of whether
courts can or should make that choice will probably never arise,
since the unique presence of the FPC letters in the case suggests
it will most likely be narrowly limited to its facts, which may well
never occur again.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Jette v. Bergland" merits attention as the first case directly
holding that a plaintiff may seek judicial review of an agency's
decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS),8 even though the plaintiff has failed to exhaust available
sources of administrative review. The holding is a logical exten-
sion of Tenth Circuit decisions limiting agency discretion in im-
plementing the procedural mandates of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). 1 It also follows logically from the
flexible nature of the doctrine of administrative remedies, as that
doctrine has been defined by the Supreme Court. 0 However, as
part of its justification the Jette court included an attack on the
procedures an agency used to arrive at its decision not to prepare
an EIS. That attack may have weakened the precedential value
of the opinion, since it arguably represents the sort of judicial
intrusion into agency procedures which the Supreme Court vigor-
ously condemned in a critical NEPA decision handed down only
the month before Jette was decided." Nevertheless, intimations
in one other recent Supreme Court NEPA case suggest the Jette
holding should survive as an important precedent fostering early
u 570 F.2d at 1378.
- 579 F.2d 59 (1978).
" The statutory provision requiring preparation of impact statements is 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1976).
U The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ecology Center, Inc. v. Coleman.
515 F.2d 860, 864-67 (1975), although the conclusion was not a necessary basis of its
decision, since it found there was an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff had exhausted
his administrative remedies.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
" See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
1 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978).
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court review of the NEPA threshold decision."
NEPA litigation has focused not on the many and broad
substantive provisions of the Act, but rather on the one specific
procedural mandate requiring agencies to prepare impact state-
ments." The Act itself helped initiate that focus by requiring
agencies to comply with the EIS mandate "to the fullest extent
possible"'" while only requiring them to comply with the sub-
stantive mandate through "all practical means, consistent with
other essential considerations."'" Thus, as construed by the
courts, the EIS provision "mandates a particular sort of careful
and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially en-
forceable duties.""
The question of whether an agency has adequately complied
with the EIS mandate does not arise until after resolution of the
earlier threshold question of whether the action in question com-
prises a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.' 7 A related question, and the pri-
mary issue raised in Jette, is what is the proper timing for judicial
review of an agency's answer to the threshold question?
The agency involved in the Jette case was the Forest Service.
The plaintiff had objected to its decision that approval of exten-
sive road building and mining exploration in a national forest did
not require preparation of an EIS. However, he chose not to pur-
sue available administrative appeals of the agency's decision. 8
Thus, the primary issue on appeal was whether administrative
remedies were sufficiently exhausted to alllow judicial review of
the decision. The Tenth Circuit held that they were, citing the
Supreme Court's classic explication of the flexible nature of the
exhaustion doctrine in McKart v. United States" as its primary
authority.
" See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). For a comprehensive discussion of the reasons
for that focus and decisions developing it, see McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and
NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEx. L. Rav. 801 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
0 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Agencies must only prepare an EIS for actions fitting
that description. Id.
" 579 F.2d at 62.
" 579 F.2d at 62 (citing 395 U.S. 185 (1969)).
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The court's application of McKart should have sufficed to
support its decision. McKart emphasized that a plaintiff's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies does not dictate summary
judgment for the defendant; rather, it dictates a balancing of
interests and careful consideration of the purposes of the doc-
trine.' ® Judge Doyle, writing for the court in Jette, noted that a
primary purpose of the doctrine is to give agencies a chance to
apply their expertise or discretion. He claimed that purpose is not
relevant to the NEPA threshold decision, since under the strong
NEPA mandate, agencies have little discretion to exercise. Al-
though the extent of agencies' discretion in determining whether
the EIS requirement applies is a current point of controversy,' 01
Tenth Circuit opinions certainly support Judge Doyle's claim. 02
In addition, the sweeping wording of the statutory test, plus the
statutory qualification that the EIS mandate is to be followed "to
the fullest extent possible" both suggest that agency discretion is
limited, especially in reference to actions such as those in Jette,
which undeniably have a broad impact on the environment.'
The second purpose of the exhaustion doctrine upon which
Judge Doyle implicitly focused is the desirability of avoiding pre-
mature interruption of the administrative process. He cited sev-
eral decisions emphasizing the importance of carrying out the
NEPA procedural obligations without delay.'4That line of rea-
soning offers the strongest support for the holding, in that it rests
on and implements the congressional concern underlying NEPA.
If the EIS requirement is to effectuate the dual goals of forcing
agencies to reorder their priorities in the process of decisionmak-
ing, and fostering protection of the environment by preventing
initiation of government actions which might have adverse envi-
ronmental effects, then agencies must be required to prepare
395 U.S. at 193-95.
'' For discussions of that controversy see Comment, The Developing Common Law
of "Major Federal Action" Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 31 Apx. L. Rv.
254 (1977); McGarity, supra note 93; Trubek, Allocating the Burden of Environmental
Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets NEPA's Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 747.
10 See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
'" See 579 F.2d at 61, 64.
IU 579 F.2d at 63 (citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th
Cir. 1971) and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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impact statements before decisions harden into established poli-
cies which are not likely to be reevaluated objectively, and before
actions commence and cause irreparable damage to the environ-
ment.
Unfortunately, the Jette court focused attention not on the
delay caused by postponement of judicial review, but on what it
termed the "shameful delay" of the Forest Service in determining
whether an impact statement should have been filed.'0 5 That
focus projected a confusing rationale. Judge Doyle first noted that
the Forest Service had used an Environmental Analysis Report
(EAR) as a means of considering whether an EIS was necessary. '0
He then attacked the EAR as just "another layer of bureaucratic
paperwork," "invented" by the Forest Service to "avoid" prepa-
ration of an EIS while allowing the activity which damages the
environment to continue.10 While inclusion of such candid ap-
praisals in judicial opinions can be both courageous and refresh-
ing, it should perhaps be reserved for those cases where such
candor is necessary to explain or support the holding, and where
the validity of the appraisal is made evident in the opinion. The
Jette opinion offered no support for the implied premise that the
EAR was used to make the threshold decision, yet failed to re-
quire consideration of the magnitude of the operation in terms of
the required statutory standards. Furthermore, the question of
whether the Forest Service adequately considered statutory cri-
teria in arriving at its negative EIS decision was not the issue in
Jette; it was the issue to be addressed on remand.
The majority's premature conclusion that the procedures se-
lected by the Forest Service for making its threshold decision
were "meaningless" and inspired by dubious motives provoked
an indignant attack by the dissent.' It also may have weakened
the precedential value of Jette, since attempts by courts to pre-
vent agencies from fashioning their own rules of procedure-even
in the context of NEPA's judicially enforceable mandates-were
recently condemned by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 109
' 579 F.2d at 63.
iM Id.
107 Id.
,m Id. at 65.
,0 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978). The Vermont Yankee Court stressed the limited role of a
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In view of the importance of establishing the right of plain-
tiffs to seek judicial review of threshold decisions before complete
exhaustion of administrative appeals, one wishes the Jette court
had heeded the warning of Vermont Yankee and avoided unnec-
essary attack on the EAR policy of the Forest Service as partial
justification for its holding. Instead, the court could have turned
to a recent Supreme Court decision which addressed a similar
NEPA timing issue to find strong, if indirect, persuasive support
for its holding. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,"0 the Court held that
NEPA does not give courts authority to review the adequacy of
an agency's environmental considerations relating to federal ac-
tions until those actions are actually proposed, rather than
merely contemplated."' Thus, under Kleppe, an agency's own
threshold decision must predate judicial review. However, it is
important to note that a vocal minority of the Court objected to
even that much delay before allowing judicial review of whether
an EIS is required. It noted that "NEPA contemplates agency
consideration of environmental factors throughout the decision-
making process," suggesting that "[elarly consideration of envi-
ronmental consequences . . . is the whole point of NEPA." 2
The existence and vigor of the Kleppe dissent suggests that
a narrow reading of the holding is appropriate: it bars judicial
review before an agency's threshold decision is formally due, but
it does not suggest such review must await complete exhaustion
of administrative review. On the contrary, the Kleppe majority
specifically stated that "the time at which a court enters the
process is when the report or recommendation on the proposal is
made, and someone protests either the absence or the adequacy
of the final impact statement. This is the point at which an
court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration of environmental factors,
even in the NEPA context. Id. at 1217. It based its decision on "the very basic tenent [sic]
of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure."
Id. at 1212.
" 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
" d. at 406. The Court cited 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and its own earlier decision in
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975), as authority for its
underlying assertion that an agency need not have an EIS ready until such time as it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. It reasoned that since
that procedural mandate is "quite precise .. the role of the courts in enforcing that duty
is similarly precise." Id.
"I Id. at 415-17 (Marshall, J., with whom Brennan, J., joined, dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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agency's action has reached sufficient maturity to assure that
judicial intervention will not hazard unnecessary disruption."" 3
Thus, although the Court was admittedly not addressing the spe-
cific issue of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies must
predate judicial review, its assertion clearly suggests that review
at the time of the initial agency determination would not defeat
the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine by prematurely interrupt-
ing the agency's procedures.
The Jette decision may be perceived as facilitating "judicial
activism" as a means of implementing the NEPA EIS mandate."'
Although it can be argued that both Kleppe and Vermont Yankee
portend an early end to judicial activism in forcing agency com-
pliance with NEPA's procedural mandates, Jette's authorization
of early judicial review seems firmly grounded in the Supreme
Court's own pronouncements in McKart and Kleppe. Thus, it
appears Jette may well survive as an important addition to the
growing federal common law giving shape to and forcing imple-
mentation of NEPA."5
Judith L. Roberts
"I Id. at 406 n.15.
' For a discussion of the potential benefits of judicial activism in implementing
NEPA, see Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 498 (1977).
For a discussion of the need for judicial activism as a means of overcoming the reluctance
of agencies to comply with NEPA, see Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation:
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. Ras. J. 323 (1976).
"I Referring to NEPA in his dissent in Kleppe, Justice Marshall remarked that "this
vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for develop-
ment of a 'common law' of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner
and have created such a 'common law.' " 427 U.S. at 421.

